Taunsa Barrage Q&A: Emergency Rehabilitation and Modernization Project

Q: What is the Taunsa Barrage?
Q: The World Bank-supported rehabilitation of the Taunsa Barrage is characterized as an “emergency project”. Why emergency?
Q: What are the main benefits of the Project? Who benefits?
Q: How long will it take to repair Taunsa and how much will it cost?
Q: How will these improvements be monitored and maintained?
Q: Was an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) prepared? What were the impacts identified and corresponding mitigation measures?
Q: When did the resettlement happen and what measures were taken to minimize the impact?
Q. What is the current status of resettlement implementation?
Q: Do the residents own the land on which their new homes are built?
Q: A number of resettled people are claiming to be indigenous. What is the Bank’s policy on this?
Q: What is the story about the dead dolphin?
Q: Why was the D.G. Khan Canal Closed during 2005-06 rabi season?
Q: What impact did the 2005-06 rabi season canal closure have on farmers in the D.G. Khan command area? What, if any, remedial measures were taken?
Q: What is the Taunsa canal operation schedule for 2006-07 rabi season?
Q: What are the actions taken to address the potential impact of the cofferdam breach and the result?
Q: What action WB has taken to rectify the matter?
Q: As the WB is a main financier to the project, who is going to bear the additional cost, the Bank, Punjab or the contractor?
Q: What is the World Bank's response to activists’ demands of an independent enquiry commission for the project?
Q. Are the POE reports and terms of reference for the POE review public?

Q: What is the Taunsa Barrage?

A:  The Taunsa Barrage on the River Indus (see map) was completed in 1958 to divert water to two large areas on the left and right banks of the river making irrigated agriculture possible for about 1.18 Mha of this arid landscape in Punjab Province.

Indus River waters are diverted into the Dera Ghazi Khan (D. G. Khan) canal that runs for over a hundred miles north-south along the Indus River right bank irrigating about 400,000 ha, and into the Muzaffargarh canal along the Indus River left bank to irrigate about 385,000 ha. Water is also diverted at Taunsa through the Taunsa-Punjnad (T.P.) Link canal to supplement the water supply for an additional 394,000 ha land along the lower reaches of the Chenab River. The Taunsa Barrage has helped some 6 million Pakistanis, ranging from rich landholders to poor subsistence farmers to make a living growing wheat and cotton on an otherwise bone-dry plain.

In addition to regulating the waters of the Indus River, the barrage also carries a critical road link, a gas and oil pipeline, and telecom links across the river. This makes the Taunsa structure a major conduit between Southern Punjab and the provinces to the south (Sindh) and west (Baluchistan).

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Q:  The World Bank-supported rehabilitation of the Taunsa Barrage is characterized as an “emergency project”.  Why emergency?

A:  Design deficiencies and aging have resulted in numerous structural weaknesses in the barrage and an unstable hydraulic situation exists in the downstream portion of the barrage. Although it is difficult to determine exactly when or how the Taunsa Barrage might fail, experts were of the view that the weaknesses were so serious that failure could conceivably occur in the near future. An international panel of independent experts established to review the project feasibility study and design concluded in August 2004 that “the present condition of the Barrage has deteriorated to an extent where the failure of the structure is highly probable”.  

Failure of the barrage would not only cause immediate flood damage and potential loss of life but also cause total crop failure in the 785,000 ha irrigated directly by water from the barrage as well as cause an extended interruption of drinking water supply in the canal command areas. As a result, its immediate rehabilitation was considered an emergency. 

In addition to these dangers, the barrage was operating below its potential efficiency because faulty design prevented it being used to its limits (i.e., it could not be operated in a way that would provide full water supply to each of the three canals). This meant that for some considerable time the canals on either side had been unable to withdraw water at their design capacities and could not serve their full command areas.

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Q: What are the main benefits of the Project? Who benefits?

A: A rehabilitated Taunsa Barrage will benefit a total of 1,179 million ha, including direct benefits for about 725,000 ha.  The main crops grown in this area are wheat in rabi season (dry season) and cotton in kharif season (wet season). Rehabilitation will enable the diversion of water at the original design capacity of these canals, significantly increasing water supply and improving its reliability for irrigation and drinking benefiting some 8 million people.
   
In a region where annual rainfall is only 150mm, the summer and winter crops are almost entirely dependent on irrigation. The failure of Taunsa would cause annual agricultural losses of an estimated $300 million.  In addition, there would be the cost of temporary repairs to restore irrigation service and then the cost of full rehabilitation. In carrying out an economic analysis of the project, the benefits were taken as the value of the avoided crop losses and the costs associated with the failure, and compared with the investment cost of immediate rehabilitation. For example, if Taunsa were to fail in the next five years, the economic rate of return (ERR) on the investment in rehabilitation today would be 42 percent, or if failure should occur in ten years, the estimated ERR would be 17 percent. Both economic rates of return are quite acceptable for public investment in Pakistan.

The people who will benefit from the optimal functioning of the barrage are the farmers and residents of the two canal command areas; they will have much more reliable irrigation and drinking water supply not only in the winter or rabi crop season but also in the summer or kharif season. In addition, heavy siltation has plagued the D.G.Khan canal for years. A silt excluder is now added to the barrage to decrease sediment inflow into the canal during operations and reduce the water supply disruptions siltation causes.

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Q: How long will it take to repair Taunsa and how much will it cost?

A: The Project has three components: (a)rehabilitation and strengthening works; (b) renovation of gates and hoists and strengthening O & M facilities; and (c) consulting services and implementation support.  The project is being implemented by pre-qualified construction firms contracted through international open competitive bidding. The total implementation period is three and half years. The Bank-supported project will be completed in slightly over three years at an estimated total cost of US$134 million, of which US$ 123 million is being provided through a World Bank loan. The loan became effective in April 2005, and is due to close in December 2008. Overall, the implementation of the project is on schedule and monitoring reports indicate that the quality of the engineering work has been satisfactory.

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Q: How will these improvements be monitored and maintained?

A: Safety of the structure will be monitored by instruments installed in the barrage structures and its foundations. The project will also strengthen operation and maintenance (O&M) through staff training and modernization of all aspects of O&M with a special emphasis on safety management and emergency preparedness.

During project implementation, the Government will prepare an Operation andMaintenance (O&M) manual for the barrage.  These along with the increased capacity and specialized monitoring and maintenance equipment provided under the project should enable the Punjab Government to sustain the economic life and performance of the barrage. 

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• Operations Phase Impacts – Since 1972 the pond and shore area behind the barrage (an area of about 6,567 ha) have been a protected game and wildlife sanctuary, and in 1996 it was declared to be a RAMSAR site.  The site is an important wintering, nesting and resting area for migratory and resident waterfowl (it is located on the Indus Flyway) including several rare species.  The rare Indus dolphin and otter are also present there.  The EIA determined that operational pond levels will remain within current seasonal ranges when the rehabilitation is completed and that there will be no significant ecological impact from the rehabilitation.

• Construction Phase Impacts – Potential construction phase impacts identified in the EIA included temporary land acquisition, local labor, canal closures, access and vehicle impacts (dust, noise and safety) and safety and health (particularly sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV/AIDS).  At the time of the EIA a detailed site and construction plan was not available. The Government assured the Bank that no land acquisition and hence no involuntary resettlement would be necessary.  The government also gave assurances that the duration and timing of closures would remain the same as under the pre-project regime, and that the other identified issues would be addressed as indicated in the Environmental Management Plan (EMP). 

An Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared in the form of guidelines that were incorporated into the bidding documents and contracts for construction, and were to be incorporated into the new O&M Manual for the barrage when the project was completed.  The Government agreed to implement the EMP, constantly monitor the key indicators given in the EMP, and provide the Bank with an annual environmental monitoring or audit reports. The Bank received the first environmental audit report for the project in August, 2006.

After the project was launched in May 2005 and more detailed construction program were prepared by the contractor after its mobilization, the determination that no land acquisition would be needed proved inaccurate. About 160 households were moved from the construction site between late July, 2005 and early August, 2005 to a location selected in consultation with the project affected people (PAP). In order to ensure that the impact of these types of significant changes from those represented in the EIA and EMP are recognized and mitigation actions taken in a timely manner, the Bank required that the Project Management Office (PMO) prepare a Change Management Statement (CMS) to update the EIA. The first such CMS was prepared by the project authorities with the assistance of an international wetlands expert and submitted to the Bank in March 2006.  The CMS (2006) is available in the Bank’s public information center.

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A: The contractor is responsible for the care of water during construction, the safety of the site and areas that could be affected by a failure and for logistical arrangements (material and equipment storage, worker housing, etc.) that ensure that the construction is carried out and completed in the most cost efficient and timely manner.  The contractor was mobilized at the site in June and July, 2005. The relocation of about 160 households, which was not anticipated at the time of the EIA, was carried out in late July and early August, 2005.

The affected community comprises predominantly Mohanas, who call themselves Sheikh. In addition, there are some Bhattis, Khetrans, and Chandios sub-community groups as well.  The community does not have an indigenous leadership structure. Their common language is Saraiki, generally spoken in Southern Punjab.

The livelihoods of a significant majority of affected households are connected to the river.  The men spend their time collecting river grass and twigs from the bushes that women use to make traditional jhaarus (brooms) and to weave baskets. Most households are involved in more than one occupational activity with broom making, basket making and fishing constituting about 85% of average household income with respective shares of 33, 32 and 20 percent.

Overall reported average monthly household income is at Rs.11,613. Average monthly household income of the affected community on the Right Bank is comparatively lower (Rs. 8,630/month) than that of the Left Bank (Rs. 12,078/month).  The only apparent difference between the two communities is the larger household size of the community on the Right Bank at 11.1 compared to 4.8 on the Left Bank.

The displacement of these families was carried out between late July and early August, 2005 without prior notification to or approval of the World Bank. The Bank learned about the displacement from a local NGO and within weeks visited the site and required that a resettlement action plan (RAP) be prepared by the project authority. The RAP was approved by the Bank in November 2005. 

Prior to displacement, the people were living on the river banks in houses and dwellings made of mud walls and brick masonry laid with clay mortar. Few of them had in-house toilets, electricity, and collective or individual water pumps. At the new resettlement sites all the affected households have access to these facilities. The new resettlement sites are furnished with electricity, collective or individual water pumps, and toilets.

Complaints of police coercion of the people to be relocated were lodged with the Government and the Bank. As the Bank was not a witness to the initial relocation process and had not approved it, the Bank has not been able to determine a single verifiable version of events. The Bank was concerned about allegations of police enforcement during the resettlement and requested an investigation by a third party.  The investigation by the Muzaffargarh District Coordination Officer found that no police intimidation took place but this could not be further verified.

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A. Implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for 150 households started in November 2005 and is now completed satisfactorily: compensation payment, housing construction, provision of community facilities including streets and open drains, mosques, shared toilets and hand pumps, etc. Using a grievance mechanism established under the plan, a further 10 households qualified for resettlement bringing the total households resettled to 160. In addition to compensation for physical assets, all the affected households are paid an income disturbance allowance varying between Rs. 10,000 to Rs 26,000 depending upon the household size. Additional cash allowances were paid to especially vulnerable households identified by the community’s Committee. Furthermore, some community members have received work and training from the contractor at the project site. The mid-term review in April 2007 indicates that the living conditions for the resettler households have clearly improved in terms of housing, infrastructure and public service facilities and that the resettler and host villagers are generally satisfied with the resettlement progress and outcome.

The entire community of relocated households is represented by 13 community leaders elected by them to take decisions. This group includes two women. Five of these representatives, including one Imam who leads prayers in a mosque, were interviewed by the Bank in mid-May 2006. They told the Bank that the decision to move was taken by the community itself which asked the Irrigation Department for assistance. They also said that the identification of the new sites was done collectively by the project authorities and the community and that no force was used during the relocation. The list of affected households and their losses was prepared and endorsed by the community leaders and the compensation is based on the list provided to the project authorities. They found the Rs 40,000 compensation for structures was rather low but nonetheless acceptable, they said.

Among some concerns the five leaders raised was that the new settlement was a little farther from the river causing worry about their hold over fishing access they had enjoyed previously.  All the legitimate applications of the affected communities members have been or are being processed  by the 1st and 2nd tier grievance redress committees set up for the project. One issue which is being addressed as a high priority through PRSP initiative is the livelihood/business development assistance. A total of 17 Community Organizations have been formed at the relocated and neighboring communities.

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A: The land belongs to the Irrigation Department. The Irrigation Department discussed the proposal of providing land titles to the project affected persons (PAPs) with the Land Revenue Department but was informed that it was not possible. Ultimately Irrigation Department prepared a site layout/plan showing both the locations of resettlement and neighboring communities in consultation with the local communities concerned. This site plan is to be shared with the communities.

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A: Based on information gathered by a Bank team of social development experts, the displaced community at Taunsa does not possess the characteristics given in the Bank policy on Indigenous Peoples. They are an occupational group living near the barrage for its access to the river and flood protection. Their livelihoods are based primarily on fishing and gathering reeds. Many of them are also seasonal or itinerant workers. They do not maintain distinct social institutions from their neighbors and do not speak a distinct language.

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In September, 2006, WWF-Pakistan provided a report on the alleged deaths of one or more Indus Dolphins at Taunsa. The original report of the dolphin deaths claimed a dolphin had become stranded in the D.G. Khan canal.  The WWF report concludes that there was no evidence of a dolphin becoming stranded in the D. G. Khan Canal; however, interviews indicated that a dolphin became entangled in a fishing-net near gate number 45 of the barrage on December 7, 2005. Apparently, it was released from the net, photographed outside the water, and released back into the river. Its subsequent survival is uncertain.

Following this incident, the Contractor has set up and organized basic training to a Dolphin Rescue Team, and employed a game watcher to ensure the protection of the Indus Dolphin and other species. It was agreed with IPD in September 2006 that WWF – Pakistan and PWD will assist in such initiatives in the future.  In early 2007, the Sociologist of the Supervising Consultant and four persons from the fishing community settled at Taunsa Barrage attended 2-day training in dolphin handling at the Dolphin Rescue Center, Sukkur, Sindh, Pakistan.

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A:  Nearly the entire Indus Basin irrigation system consists of earthen canals with some among the largest and longest in the world. Such canals, for which the science of their design was done in Punjab in the early 20th century, are remarkably stable if well maintained and operated as designed. Efficient and effective maintenance is enhanced if the canal is closed for a brief period every year. The canals in Punjab are normally closed in the dry season each year, usually for a period of 4 weeks in December and January, to carry out annual maintenance and repair, after an initial watering of the predominant winter wheat crop.  

Not all canals receive water in the winter or rabi season. Before storage was built to provide regulation of the Indus River and its tributaries in the 1970s (at Tarbela and Mangla dams), the limited water available in the rivers in the dry season had to be allocated to a few canals. Historically, these canals were called perennial canals because they were entitled to water in both the wet and dry seasons and commonly had water in them year round. The remaining canals were called non-perennial canals, and these were entitled to water only in the wet season. This classification and corresponding entitlements were enshrined in the original irrigation acts adopted in the late 19th century. The rules in these acts were quite strict. For example, the amended Canal and Drainage Act (1973) states that " no claims shall be made against the government for compensation in respect to losses caused by the failure or stoppage of the water in a canal for the purpose of any repairs, alterations or additions to the irrigation infrastructure" .

Since the construction of storage reservoirs at Tarbela and Mangla, more water has generally been available for irrigation in the dry season, and many non-perennial canals have regularly received water since that time. However, the position of the IPD is that this condition has not changed the original legal entitlements, or in the case of non-perennial canals, their lack of a legal entitlement in the dry season. They receive a water allocation only in those months and years when water availability exceeds the entitlement of the perennial canals. The determination of water availability and its allocation among the canals is made by the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) based on the inter-provincial Water Apportionment Accord and estimated demands provided by the respective provincial irrigation departments. Hence, the period during which a non-perennial canal does not operate (has no water flowing in it) each year depends not only on the time it takes to complete scheduled maintenance, but also on the availability of water for the canal, i.e., in a water short year these canals would generally not operate for a period longer than is required for maintenance because water availability is less than they would expect to receive in a normal year.  

The D.G. Khan Canal and Muzaffargarh Canal fed by Taunsa Barrage are both non-perennial canals. They both had received water allocations in the dry season every year over the period 1995-2004 and they both are regularly closed for annual maintenance and lack of water, especially the D. G. Khan canal which has had chronic sedimentation problems that have limited its capacity. Over the period 1995-2004, the average number of days in the dry season during which the D. G. Khan canal is not operational or without water was about 63 days (ranging from 20 to 88 days), and for Muzaffargarh canal 99 days (ranging from 33 to 135 days). The high variability of these periods without water and their length are most strongly influenced by limited water availability.    

The winter low flow season in the Indus River is the critical construction period for emergency repair of the Taunsa Barrage. In 2005-2006 work was planned for the right side of the barrage (repair of the damaged downstream floor of the barrage) and the D.G Khan headworks requiring closure of the D.G. Khan canal for a longer period than the normal closure period for maintenance. Moreover, water availability in the 2005-2006 rabi season was low. Only 1.036 million acre feet (Maf) was available for D.G Khan and Muzaffargarh canals (50% of the total water allocation is given to each canal) in comparison to the long term average of 1.5 Maf, and the allocation of 1.36 Maf in 2006-2007. Subsequently, in 2005-06, the D.G. Khan canal was closed from November 15-December 16, 2005 and January 1-February 23, 2006 (86 days) and the Muzaffargarh Canal from December 17, 2005 to February 23, 2006 (69 days).

During the 2005-06 rabi season, the Irrigation Department supplied water to the D.G. Khan canal to facilitate wheat sowing from October 15 to November 14, 2005 along the D.G. Khan Canal and drinking water supply through an existing feeder channel from December 17-31, 2005. It was reported that the farmers concerned were informed of the canal operation schedule through Agriculture and Irrigation Departments’ field staff but some farmers in the canal command areas interviewed by the Bank team either did not receive the information or did not receive it in time to make adjustments.

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A:  The long history of canal closure for maintenance in Pakistan has resulted in farmer's adoption and development of a variety of coping mechanisms. For example, in more recent times with the great expansion of tube wells in usable groundwater areas, farmers have an important alternative to canal water to irrigate their winter crops. Of critical importance to the farmer is timely knowledge that there will be a closure, when it will begin, and how long it will last. Adjustments such as harvesting the preceding kharif season crop, what crop and what variety to grow, when to plant, or whether to leave all or a part of the land fallow depends on this information.  

Despite the reported efforts of the IPD to inform farmers about the canal operation schedule in the 2005-2006 rabi season, it was not effective, and some claims of damages ensued. The Bank team endeavored to investigate the effect of the long non-operational period of D.G.Khan Canal in 2005-2006 on rabi crops in the canal command area. Production data from the Agriculture Department for the districts included in the canal command areas suggests that overall there was not a significant reduction in wheat production in the area in comparison with previous years. The exception is some union councils of Rajanpur district in the D. G. Khan canal command, which is a saline groundwater area, where it appears farmers had few if any alternatives once it became clear that no canal water would be available. In contrast, farmers in fresh groundwater areas, even if they did not own a tube well would commonly be able to buy tube well water in lieu of the canal water (groundwater markets are quite common in fresh groundwater areas of Punjab ). Data collected by the Bank mission indicates that the long non-operational period of canal could have contributed to the adverse impact on some farmers. However, available data is not adequate to determine with any precision which farmers were impacted and the extent or nature of those impacts.

The Provincial Government launched a poverty targeted program (Punjab Rural Support Program, PRSP), which is an integrated pro-poor rural development program for four southern districts of Punjab, namely Layyah, D.G.Khan, Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh, of which the last three districts constitute the Taunsa command area, in the summer of 2006. This program, supported by about US$5 million, is planned to run for four years. The Bank requested that this program give a special emphasis to the four union councils (UCs) in Jampur tehsil of Rajanpur district where a significant decrease in wheat area sown during the 2005-06 rabi season was observed. The immediate assistance to the 4 UCs targets small farmers (with landholding size of 12.5 acres or less). In these four UCs, wheat seeds have been distributed to 7,047 small farmers owning 40,593 acres of land in the 2006-07 rabi sowing season. Over 100 hand pumps were installed to improve drinking water supply.  A large number of Community Organizations (COs) have been formed whose members will benefit from the routine programs of PRSP, namely construction of physical infrastructure, provision of micro credit, skill training etc. The PRSP activities have now been expanded to other areas of the DG Khan and Muzarffagarh canal command as well as Taunsa project site.

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A:  To minimize construction-related interruptions to canal operation, the Irrigation Department engaged an independent international panel of experts to review and optimize the project construction program. Related project construction this rabi season was planned to be undertaken when the canals are non-operational due to lack of water availability. At the same time, preventive measures such as repair of damaged state tube wells, and installation of hand pumps, to mitigate possible impact on farmers in brackish groundwater zones of Muzaffargarh Canal Command were undertaken Accordingly, 42 state-owned tube wells were made operational thus augmenting water supplies, 30 COs were formed to undertake developmental activities as aforementioned, and 126 hand pumps were installed for increasing the drinking water supply. Furthermore, a multi-media communication strategy and program was implemented for wide and timely consultation and information dissemination in the canal command areas well in advance of the planned closure period that year.

The canal operation schedule for 2006-07 rabi season was disseminated at the beginning of the rabi season to the farmers concerned through different media (27,000 pamphlets, loud speakers in village mosques, radio and press conference, IPD and Agriculture Department staff, District Nazims, Tehsil Nazims, Nazims and members of Union Councils etc.). The canal operation schedule was virtually in accordance with the Indus water allocation plan proposed by Punjab and approved by IRSA based on its forecast a 14% shortfall in water availability for the 2006-07 rabi season, before it was publicly disclosed. The actual closure period of the two canals emanating from Taunsa Barrage during the dry winter season (rabi), were as follows: The D.G. Khan Canal, from December 11, 2006 to January 27, 2007, and Muzaffargarh Canal, from December 11, 2006 to February 21, 2007 respectively. This schedule was also the result of the cofferdam breach which took a few days to fill.

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A. The upstream cofferdam breached on January 15 at about 7:15 pm, at a distance of about 300 feet from the left bank of the river and inundated ongoing grouting and concreting work on the downstream barrage floor on two bays; breached a small coffer dam enclosing the work area; and damaged part of main downstream cofferdam (without breaching it) which encloses the area where the downstream sub-weir is under construction. No casualties occurred and no damage to private land and/or assets was reported. The breach was closed on January 19 and measures are being taken to strengthen the cofferdam and prevent recurrence of similar incidents. The Irrigation Department and its contractor/consultants endeavored to minimize the delays in canal water supply. Reportedly drinking water supplies to DG Khan canal  resumed on January 27 against the original date of January 16 – a delay of 11 days. The delay of irrigation supplies was announced and publicized widely as was done for drinking water supplies. The irrigation water supply was started on February 15 in place of February 11 - a delay of 4 days.

In terms of mitigation measures, installation of hand pumps continued in the four union councils of Rajanpur district and Thal branch of Muzarffagarh Canal.

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A. The Bank team visited the site promptly and discussed with the government project team ways to restore/strengthen the cofferdam and enhance vigilance at site, accelerate the implementation of the agreed mitigation measures (see above) and take additional measures based on assessment of adequacy of those measures for drinking water supply.

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A. There are provisions in the construction contract regarding responsibility and costs for handling and care of water for construction.  If there is a contractual dispute about this matter once the causes of the breach is determined, the Irrigation Department and the Contractor would settle it using the mechanism specified in the contract. The Bank is not a party to the contract, and nor the supervisor for contract implementation.

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A. The matter of independent review of project impact was discussed, and the Government of Punjab and the Bank agreed to expand the scope of the existing independent Panel of Experts (POE) to include social and environmental experts and review the environmental and social aspects of project implementation. The POE review meeting will take place on August 15, 2007. The POE is to interact with the local communities and those interested during the review. An assessment of the mitigation measures taken is part of the tasks of the POE review.

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A. The government hires the POE for the review and has the ownership of the various reports produced. The Bank as a financier assists the government to implement the projects in line with its objectives while complying with our policies, and has to rely, on many occasions, on the government sovereign decisions. The Bank recommendation to the Irrigation Department has been that the report from the review be made public.

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